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Non technical summary
The recent interest in the economics of crime has been stimulated by the dramatic
increase in crime rates in the western world on the one hand, and by recent
demographic and socioeconomic problems like youth unemployment, migration and
increasing inequality on the other. Our study is based on the traditional Becker-
Ehrlich deterrence model, but we analyse the model in the face of currently
discussed crime factors. Several new features are added to the existing literature.
1)  Evidence from a panel of the German Laender (states) allows us to explore the
different experiences in highly and sparsely populated areas. Moreover, it
enables us to look at differences between East and West Germany.
2)  Since unemployment can aggravate the probability of being in a young group
with "dangerous” social interactions, we estimate the impact of being young
and unemployed.
3)  Demographic factors like urbanisation and population density effects are taken
into account. Moreover, we are trying to shed some light on the validity of the
popular argument that the number of foreigners is responsible for growing
German crime rates.
4)  We add a new relative income variable that might explain crime due to a lack
of legal income opportunities ("envy” effects).
5)  The impact of unemployment is divided into the investigation of overall
unemployment and youth unemployment effects.
6)  Our paper breaks up aggregate crime into 8 crime categories. Thus, we are in
the position to separate property crime, which might be more directly related to
the rational offender, and crime against the person.
7)  Our estimation strategy is based on static and dynamic panel
econometrics/criminometrics.
Our results confirm the deterrence hypothesis for crime against property (i.e. higher
clear-up rates reduce crime against property), but only weak support can be
observed for crime against the person. Economic variables that are used to measure
legal and illegal income opportunities perform well in estimations for crime against
property. Absolute income turns out to be a measure of illegal rather than legal
income opportunities (i.e. higher income is associated with higher crime rates).
Results based on relative income show that a widening income gap with respect to
richer regions increases the probability of delinquent behaviour. Thus, growing
inequality seems to be an important factor of crime. Demographic factors reveal
important and significant influences. As usually found in the literature, we observe
higher crime rates in highly urbanized areas. Moreover, we confirm the ambigous
result for general unemployment. However, being young and unemployed increases
the probability of committing crimes. Additionally, also simply being young
aggravates the danger of getting into the bad company of a group with harmful
social interactions. Interpreting the influence of the aggregate share of foreigners is
difficult in aggregate studies and can only be tentative. Our results suggest that the
share of foreigners in Germany is positively associated with crime against property,
in particular theft. For all other types of crime, the effect is not clear or
insignificant. As regards crime in the eastern and western part of Germany, there
remains a higher crime rate in the east, even after controlling for differences in legal
and illegal income opportunities and other factors of crime. The reason for this is
not clear. Possibly, prosecution of crime and administration of justice are still
organized inefficiently in eastern Germany. An other explanation might be that the
newly gained freedom has led to (temporarily?) higher violation of social norms.
However, a reasonable explanation of the east-west crime differential would need
further research.
Abstract
Our study is based on the traditional Becker-Ehrlich deterrence model, but we
analyse the model in the face of currently discussed factors of crime like
demographic changes, youth-unemployment and income inequality. We use a panel
of the German Laender (states) that allows us to exploit different experiences in
densely and sparsely populated areas as well as in East and West Germany. Our
results are based on static and dynamic panel econometrics/criminometrics. They
confirm the deterrence hypothesis for crime against property. Only weak support
can be observed for crime against the person. Economic and demographic factors
reveal important and significant influences. Being young and unemployed increases
the probability of committing crimes.
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11 Introduction
Economic contributions in the area of crime started about 30 years ago. Prior to
1968, offenders were regarded as deviant individuals with atypical motivations. The
theory of crime was largely composed of recommendations made by sociologists,
psychologists, criminologists, political scientists and law professors that were not
based on rigorous empirical investigation, but on beliefs about concepts like
depravity, insanity and abnormality.
During the late 1960’s, economists turned their attention to the field of criminology.
The stimulus was Becker’s (1968) seminal paper on "Crime and Punishment".
Becker’s theory of deterrence is an application of the general theory of rational
behaviour under uncertainty. The model predicts how changes in the probability and
severity of sanctions may affect expected payoffs and thus the "supply" of crime.
Becker’s theoretical work was the stimulus for Ehrlich’s (1973) empirical
investigations. He extended Beckers’s work by considering a time allocation model.
The assumption of fixed leisure time requires that the remaining time is allocated to
legal and illegal activities. If legal income opportunities are scarce, then the time
allocation trade-off predicts that crime becomes more likely. Since legal income
opportunities can be measured by abilities, family income, human capital, and other
socio-demographic variables (age, race, gender, urbanization, etc.), predictions of
the Ehrlich model can be tested empirically.
The bulk of empirical studies uses the Becker-Ehrlich model to estimate the effect
of deterrence, measured by the probability and severity of punishment, and of
benefits and costs of legal and illegal activities on crime. In most studies, the effect
of deterrence variables (clearance or conviction rates, length of sentence, fines) are
found to be more or less negative, whereas income variables reveal no systematic
effect on crime (see Eide, 1994, 1997, for excellent surveys). This ambiguity
reflects the fact that income represents benefits not only for legal activities, but also
for illegal ones; therefore, a high number of rich people produce a more profitable
target for crimes. As a result, the income measure may be positively correlated with
crime rates.
After some time of relative silence with only a few major contributions in the
eighties, the last few years witness a vitalization of the "Economics of Crime" (Eide,
1994, Grogger, 1995, DiIulio, 1996, Ehrlich, 1996, Freeman, 1996, Glaeser,
Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996), to name only a few). Modern studies have been
stimulated by the dramatic increase of crime rates in western countries on the one
hand, and by recent social and economic problems like unemployment, in particular
youth unemployment, migration and increasing income inequality on the other. The
2focus of these contributions has changed from the pure testing of the deterrence
hypothesis to the analysis of socio-economic and demographic crime factors.
Our paper is in the spirit of the traditional Becker-Ehrlich deterrence model, but we
analyse the hypothesis in the face of currently discussed crime factors. Several new
features are added to the existing literature:
German data: We test the Becker-Ehrlich deterrence hypothesis using German data
(for earlier studies see Entorf, 1996 and Spengler, 1996). Evidence from a panel of
the Laender (the German states) allows us to exploit the very different experiences
in densely populated areas such as Berlin and Hamburg (which is counted as a state
of its own, a so-called "Stadtstaat", i.e. "city-state") and sparsely populated areas
such as Lower Saxony. Moreover, it enables us to look at differences between East
and West Germany.
Demographic factors: Simple descriptive statistics reveal that people under 21 years
of age are responsible for about 28% of total offenses. However, the reason for
higher crime rates might be that they are just poorer than other age groups.
Controlling for income and other economic variables, we can test the "pure" effect
of being young. Since unemployment can aggravate the probability of being in a
young group with "dangerous" social interactions, we estimate the impact of being
young and unemployed.
Crime statistics generally exhibit a positive correlation between city size and crime
rates. For the United States Glaeser and Sacerdote (1996) find that 45% of the crime
differential between cities and non-cities is due to less intact families, 26% may be
explained by higher illegal income opportunities and 12% by the lower probability
of arrest. In our investigation, urbanization and population density effects on the
crime rate are also taken into account.
Finally, we are trying to analyse the popular argument that the number of foreigners
is responsible for growing crime rates. Since East Germany has much lower rates of
foreigners, we hope to find some evidence from East/West comparisons.
Evolvement of relative income: As mentioned above, the impact of income on crime
is not clear. We add a new relative income variable that might help to clarify the
situation. The new variable measures relative wealth that might explain crime based
on "envy" effects.
Unemployment and youth unemployment: Unemployment generally seems to have
only minor effects. We are going to test if this hypothesis also holds true for
Germany. In particular, we divide the analysis into the investigation of overall
unemployment and youth unemployment effects.
3Several types of crime: Studies based on aggregated data have been critizised. This
paper breaks up aggregate crime into 8 crime categories.1 Thus, we are in the
position to separate property crime, which might be more directly related to the
rational offender, and crime against the person.
Static and dynamic estimation strategies: Our estimation strategy is based on static
and dynamic panel econometrics/criminometrics. The dynamic model is based on
the error-correction mechanism so that we can separate the long-run deterrence
behaviour from short-run adjustments due to disequilibrium situations, which, for
instance, might arise due to temporarily higher clear-up rates.
Our paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the development of crime
and of potential factors of crime in Germany. In Chapter 3, we present the basic
model and estimation methods. After introducing the data in Chapter 4, results are
reported and interpreted in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 concludes.
                                                     
1
 The choice of categories is limited by the availability of data. There are no other categories
providing data on clear-up rates (see Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik, 1996).
42 Crime and potential factors of crime
In this section we provide an extensive discussion and descriptive analysis of crime
and the potential factors of crime in Germany. The variables of interest are depicted
over time and between observational units. Analysing the crime statistics and thus
learning about regional differences in the incidence of crime and about the
sociodemographic structures of the offenders leads to a better understanding of the
factors that may prevent or foster crime.
With only a few exceptions criminal prosecution falls in the responsibility of the
Laender. This is a source of heterogeneity that makes it suitable to choose the
Laender as observational units in our descriptive and econometric analysis of crime.
Apart from the investigation of the states we have a close look at the federal level.
Moreover, we carry out comparisons between East and West Germany under special
consideration of the city-states. Our exclusive source of crime-data is the annual
crime reports of the German Federal Criminal Police Office
("Bundeskriminalamt").2
It is important to mention that all empirical investigations of crime that are based on
official statistics have at least one serious shortcoming: the statistics display not the
real intensity of crime but only the size of crime known to the police. How large the
share of unreported crimes is depends heavily on the type of crime. Generally
speaking less serious crimes have a lower probability of being reported to the police
than more serious crimes. In addition, the general reporting-propensity of citizens
and the level of clear-up efforts by the police play an important role for the number
of unrecorded cases.3
2.1 Evidence from the German Crime Statistic
6.64 Mio. crimes have been registered by the German police in 1996 from which
5.24 Mio. took place in West (including East Berlin) and 1.39 Mio. in East
Germany (not including East Berlin). Expressed in rates these numbers mean that
there have been approximately 8 offenses per 100 inhabitants in the West and a bit
less than 10 offenses per 100 citizens in East Germany. Figure 1 depicts the
development of the general crime rate in West Germnay for the past 30 years. There
has been a steady increase in West Germany’s crime rate from 3 crimes/100 persons
in 1963 to 7 crimes/100 persons in 1983. The West German crime rate reached an
all-time high in 1993 with a few more than 8 crimes/100 persons. Since 1994 the
                                                     
2
 The Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) is the information office of the Police Offices of the Laender. It
is also directly responsible for combatting organized crime and terrorism.
3
 In a discussion with an offical of the BKA we were told that research on the number of
unrecorded crimes in a big German city yielded one district with a share of unrecorded thefts of
approximatly 80%.
5crime rate remains about the same. In East Germany with a crime rate of
approximately 10 crimes/100 persons in the last four years the situation is even
more serious. Compared with other countries of the EU, German crime rates are
neither very high nor very low.4
Regarding Figure 1, two questions can be posed: first, why did crime become thus
stronger in West Germany during the last three decades? Second, why is there more
crime in East than in West Germany? We hope to shed some light on these
questions in the proceeding of our article. Knowing that the general crime rate rose
dramatically is one factor. The other important thing to know is which crime
categories are responsible for this growth. Table 1 provides an answer to this
question. Since theft is the (quantitatively) most important crime category with a
share of all crimes bigger than 55%, it was the increase of this offense that drove the
growth of the overall crime rate.
Since total theft experienced a growth of about 74% in the period from 1975 to
1996, other offenses also increased significantly. The number of environmental
offenses was eight times higher in 1996 than 20 years ago, the number of drug
offenses was six times higher in 1996, robberies, total assaults and frauds at least
                                                     
4
 The highest EU crime rate in 1994 was reported for Sweden with 12 crimes/100 inhabitants and
the lowest for Spain with 1.7 crimes/100 inhabitants (source: The Fifth United Nations Survey
of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems).
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Figure 1: General crime rates in West Germany  (1963-1996) and East Germany (1993-1996)
Source: various issues crime statistics of the German Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt)
*including East Berlin after 1990, **not including East Berlin
6doubled. The only crime categories that show a decrease are murder and
manslaughter, and rape.
Contrary to current suggestions given by mass media, violent crimes (murder and
manslaughter, rape, robbery, dangerous and serious assault) are only of minor
quantitative importance. They accounted for only 2.7% of all reported crimes in
1996. Considering only the most serious crimes (i.e. murder and manslaughter, and
rape) the share is 0.2%.5 The bulk of crimes are offenses against property, which
account for at least 75% of all crimes. In spite of this, it should be noted that the
propensity to violence has increased in the last 20 years (see robbery and assault).
                                                     
5
 If the the number of unrecorded cases could be taken into account this share would be even
smaller since serious crimes tend to be reported more frequently than other offenses.
Table 1: Development of selected offenses in West Germany
1975 1996*
Crime Category Cases,
absolute
numbers
Cases per
100,000
inhabitants
Share
of all
crimes
Cases,
absolute
numbers
cases per
100,000
inhabitants
Share
of all
crimes
Murder and manslaughter 2,908 4.7 0.1 2,839 4.2 0.1
Rape 6,850 11.1 0.2 5,373 7.9 0.1
Robbery 20,362 32.9 0.7 55,010 81.1 1.0
Dangerous and Serious
Assault
50,274 81.0 1.7 85,040 126 1.5
Assault (not dangerous or
serious)
65,674 106 2.2 164,369 243 3.1
Theft without aggravating
circumstances
864,849 1,399 29.6 1,269,521 1,877 23.5
Theft under aggravating
circumstances
1,044,569 1,689 35.8 1,558,582 2,304 31.8
Fraud 209,841 339 7.2 556,888 823 9.8
Damage to property 213,746 458 8.3 474,576 702 9.4
Drug offenses 29,805 48.2 1.0 179,754 266.0 2.8
Environmental offenses 3,445 5.6 0.1 30,109 45.0 0.6
Source: BKA, 1975, 1996
*including East Berlin
7Figure 2 displays the development of the general crime rate (the bold lines in the
upper half of the figure) for the West German Laender in the period 1975-19966. It
is striking that the very densely populated city-states of Berlin, Bremen and
Hamburg are by far the most criminal Laender in West Germany. It is surprising
that Schleswig-Holstein, as a state with a rather low population density, exhibits the
highest crime rate of all non city-states in 1996. Furthermore, it is this state that
experienced the highest relative growth in the general crime rate over the last 20
years. Generally speaking, crime rates are low in the southern part of West Germany
(Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Saarland and Rhineland-Palatinate) and high in the
north (North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein). Since
northern states are relatively poor in comparison to southern states we find it
appealing to consider measures of relative and absolute wealth as potential factors
of crime.
After investigating the incidence of crime it is straightforward to analyze the
sociodemographic properties of the offenders. From 100 suspects, approximately 75
are male, so gender seems to play an important role in the crime-deciscion. Age is
very important, since 40% of all crimes in 1996 were comitted by offenders of less
than 25 years of age.
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 (West) Berlin is only considerd until 1989 since crime data for West and East Berlin are not
displayed separatly in the years after German Unification.
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Figure 2: General crime and clear-up rates in the West German states 1975-1996 (West Berlin 1975-1989*)
Source: various issues crime statistics of the German Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt)
*After 1989 the statistics contain only information about unified Berlin.
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8Figure 3 puts age and gender in relative context to crime. It displays the number of
offenders in a certain age-gender group in relation to the absolute size of this age-
gender group in the population. It is striking that in the groups 16<18 (at least 16
and at most 17 years of age) and 18<21 for males every ninth person has been
suspect of crime. Thus, young men are the most criminal age-gender group in
relation to their population share. For example, while the population share of men
aged at least 14 and at most 24 years has been 5.7% in 1996 their share of all
suspects has been 27%. According to this evidence, it seems reasonable to use a
variable that measures the population’s share of young men in our econometric
investigations. In contrast, a gender-variable would be less appropriate because of
lacking variation over time and observational units.
Finally, it has to be mentioned that a high percentage of crimes in Germany are
committed by foreigners. In 1996, approximately 28% of all suspects were
foreigners whereas their poulation-share equaled 9.0% only. This divergence gives
rise to the use of a foreigner-variable in our estimations.
2.2 What prevents or fosters crime?
In his discussion of the determinants of crime, Eide (1997) differentiates between
three categories of variables that are commonly used in criminometrics - deterrence,
economic, and norm and taste variables. While the first and the second group of
variables are theoretically underpinned by the conventional economic crime theory
(see for example Becker, 1968 and Ehrlich, 1973) norm and taste variables are not
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Figure 3: German suspects of crime per 100,000 inhabitants of their age-group
Source: 1996 crime statistics of the German Federal Criminal Police Office
              (Bundeskriminalamt)
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9thoroughly discussed. It is true, though, that some norm and taste variables can be
interpreted in the sense of legal and/or illegal income opportunities and would thus
be partly covered by conventional theories.
Recent contibutions from economists explicitly model the influence of social factors
on the crime decision. Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) and Akerlof
(1997) investigate the importance of social interactions between individuals for the
incidence of crime. Williams and Sickles (1997) extend the existing theory by
considering the consequences of social capital formation over the life-cycle on the
crime decision. These papers make an important effort towards an interdisciplinary
crime research.
2.2.1 Deterrence
Deterrence variables i.e. clear-up rates, conviction rates and severity of punishment
are important determinants of the expected utility that potential offenders can yield
from crime, these variables have been the focus of early studies. Admittedly, this
focus changed in the eighties and nineties to economic and sociodemographic
factors, however, deterrence variables should always be present in criminometric
studies.
In his theory, Becker (1968) uses the probability of conviction and the severity of
punishment as exogenous variables in the supply-of-offenses function. In his and in
most other theoretical articles, the effect of deterrence variables on crime is clear. A
higher probability of conviction/severity of punishment leads to a reduction in the
expected utility from crime and, therefore, less offenses will be commited. As a
result, we expect negative signs for the deterrence variables in our estimations.
Unfortunately, we are only able to use the clear-up rate in our econometric
specifications, since this is the only deterrence variable for Germany that is
available on the state-level. In contrast to this, Wolpin (1978) in his empirical study
of crime in England and Wales uses five different deterence variables:
• the proportion of crimes cleared by the police (clear-up rate)
• the proportion of those arrested who either plead guilty or are convicted
(conviction rate)
• the proportion of the guilty who are imprisoned (imprisonment rate)
• the proportion of the guilty who are placed on recognizance (recognizance rate)
• the proportion of the guilty who are fined (fine rate)
• the average length of the court imprisonment sentence for those imprisoned
(average sentence)
To our knowledge this study is the only one that applies such a complete set of
deterrence variables. The majority of empirical investigations use at most two
10
deterrence variables, one of which is the severity of punishment7 and the other the
probability of being caught or convicted.
Figure 4 depicts the clear-up rates for reported aggregated crime in West and East
Germany. In the West, the rate was highest in 1963 with approximately 55%. In the
following 10 years, it fell to 45% and then moved sideways until 1992 (with some
fluctuations in the eighties). After 1992, the rate grew continuously and, in 1996,
reached the highest level since 1970. East Germany’s clear-up rate started at a very
low level (33,6%) and then increased strongly until 1996 (44,2%). In spite of this
increase it has still not reached the West German level.
Comparing Figures 1 and 4 it is striking that crime incidence and clear-up rates are
obviously negatively related. West Germany exhibits higher clear-up rates than East
Germany and at the same time less crime. This evidence can also be drawn from a
comparison of crime and clear-up rates for the Laender in Figure 2 (the clear-up
rates are presented as fine lines in the lower part of the diagram).
                                                     
7
 It should be mentioned that clear measures of the severity of punishment for aggregated crime or
special crimes can not be easily obtained since most crimes are not exclusively sanctioned by
either fines or imprisonment. As a consequence, a suitable sanction variable for
macroeconometric studies requires the conversion of time (the dimension of imprisonment) in
money (the dimension of fines) or vice versa.
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Figure 4: General clear-up rates in West Germany  (1963-1996) and East Germany (1993-1996)
Source: various issues crime statistics of the German Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt)
*including East Berlin from 1990 on, **not including East Berlin
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Baden Wuerttemberg and Bavaria have higher clear-up rates and lower crime rates
than all other states. On the other hand, states with low clear-up rates like Bremen,
Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein show a higher incidence of crime. In the context
of our previous discussion, the meaning of the graphically depicted negative
correlation is straightforward. The higher risk of being detected by the police makes
offending in Baden-Wuerttemberg ceteris paribus less attractive than in the city-
states.
Unfortunately, the reality is not as simple as it seems to be, since there is
presumably no clear causality-relation between clear-up rate and crime rate. In other
words, it is likely that, apart from the influence of the clear-up rate on the crime
rate, there is also an influence in the inverse direction. There may be two sources for
short-run simultaneity. First, if crime rises and the number of police stays the same
(for example due to budgetary limitations), police tend to be overloaded and thus
the clear-up rate falls (while the absolute number of cleared-up offenses stays the
same). This would lead to an overestimation of the effect of interest (thus, from the
clear-up rate on the crime rate). The second potential cause of bias emerges if
higher crime rates lead to protests among the population which for instance induces
politicians to hire new policemen. As a result, the clear-up rate would rise (at least
temporarily). This effect leads to an underestimation of the effect of interest.
Because the two potential sources of bias have opposite effects, the joint effect is
not evident. However, since we are mainly interested in economic long-run
behaviour, potential short-run biases should cancel out in our estimations (note that
our panel data has a relatively large time dimension; moreover, we use static and
dynamic ECM-modelling, see Chapter 3.2).
2.2.2 Legal and illegal income opportunities
The economic approach to crime builds on the appealing assumption that
"offenders, as members of the human race, respond to incentives" (Ehrlich, 1996, p.
43). Incentives determine whether crime is more or less attractive and, thus, more or
less likely committed. The deterrence variables discussed above are for example
negative incentives in the context of the crime decision. Other straightforward
incentives that slow down or foster crime are the legal and illegal income
opportunities, which may be approximated by economic variables like total income,
income distribution or unemployment. Moreover, legal wages represent the
opportunity costs of committing crimes. Grogger (1997) uses this feature of illegal
behaviour to explain why the likelihood of delinquency typically increases with age
until the late teens and then declines.
Since illegal income opportunities can not be directly measured, a proxy is needed.
Ehrlich (1973) proposes the mean family income as such a measure. He argues that
higher income means a higher level of transferable assets in the community and thus
more lucrative targets for potential criminals. Other authors use the same variable to
12
measure legal income opportunities. In this paper we follow Ehrlich, when
approximating the illegal income opportunities with the real Gross Domestic
Product per capita. The variable is depicted in bold lines in the upper half of Figure
5. Comparing Figures 1 and 5 yields some evidence for the appropriateness of our
approximation. The two richest states (Bremen and Hamburg) also have the highest
crime rates. This may be due to the fact that crime is particularly rewarding in these
rich city-states.
Whereas the interpretation of absolute income measures is ambiguous, that of
relative income measures is more straightforward. A higher income inequality, for
instance, may lead to worse legal income opportunities and at the same time to
better illegal income opportunities and thus to higher crime incentives for the lower
quantiles of the income distribution. For this reason, usual aggregate time series
studies often add income inequality as another source of crime. Our relative income
variable is depicted in lower half of Figure 5. It measures the percentage distance
between a state’s income and the mean income over all states (i.e. the federal
income). In regions that are better off than the German average, it should be easier
to get a well-paid legal job (and vice versa). Thus, ceteris paribus, people in
favoured states have less incentives to commit crimes than people in areas poorer
than average.
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Figure 5: Real GDP per capita in prices of 1991 and relative distance in real GDP
 per capita from the West German mean for West German states 
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Since unemployed persons are per definition excluded from the legal income sector,
this variable can be as well interpreted as a measure of legal income opportunities.
The unemployment rates for the West German Laender are presented in Figure 6.
The comparison of Figures 1 and 6 gives the impression that low (high)
unemployment is associated with a low (high) incidence of crime (see Baden-
Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg).
At this point it should be stressed that all judgements about potential
interrelationships between economic, deterrence and other variables that are based
on simple descriptive statistics are only preliminary. Whether these first impressions
are right or misleading can only be established in the context of our econometric
analysis in section 4.
2.2.3 Norms, tastes and social interactions
In the afore-mentioned studies (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996, Akerlof,
1997 and Williams and Sickles, 1997) the effects of social interactions and social
capital formation on crime are taken into account. Since norms, tastes and social
relations among individuals are certainly important factors for the crime-decision
we try to consider them by using sociodemographic variables in our criminometric
analysis.
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Figure 6: Unemployment rates in the West German states 1975-1996 (West Berlin 1975-1989)
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We include two norm-variables in our estimations that were partly motivated by our
descriptive analysis of suspects of crime, but also discussed in the literature (see for
example Eide, 1994). They are the percentage of foreigners and the percentage of
men aged 15-24 years in the population (foreigner-rate, young-men-rate). Both
variables are jointly presented in Figure 7. How can these variables be interpreted in
the context of norms, tastes and crime-augmenting social interactions?
Considering youth (young men) first, one might think that in general they do not
accept social (crime-averse) norms to the same extent as older people. This may be
due to age-specific rebellion or lack of hindsight (see Eide, 1994). Further, young
people are in a "better" social and physical position to commit crimes. Thus the
threat of loss in reputation and social status when being accused or convicted of a
crime is much higher for adults with well-established social networks than for
young people (see Eide, 1994). Young men are physically superior to other groups
of the population. This means that they have comparative advantages for commiting
crimes that require strength and/or speed. Older people are very often married and,
therefore, spend their leisure time within their family. Young people in contrast
spend much more time in their circle of friends and crowds. This might create
dangerous social interactions when initially law-abiding members of a clique begin
to imitate the behaviour of the group’s delinquent peers (Ploeger, 1997).
There are many reasons why foreigners are over-represented in the group of
suspects (see Pfeiffer et al., 1996, for empirical evidence on this point). First, they
5
6
7
8
9
10
0
5
10
15
20
Figure 7: Percentage of foreigners and men aged 15-24 in the population of  West German states
1975-1996 (West Berlin 1975-1989)
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may be more often wrongly suspected than the native population. Second, there are
some laws like the foreigner and asylum laws which can by definiton only be
broken by foreigners. Third, foreigners who reside in Germany are to a higher
percentage young men. Fourth, some foreigners may be in Germany after fleeing
their homeland because they were offenders there. Finally, most foreigners come to
Germany because they had no economic success in their home country. The latter
may be due to factors that foster crime, for example a lack of education. Since, in
our econometric specifications, we are interested in the pure crime-effect of being a
foreigner in Germany, all the points mentioned above are potential sources of bias.
These points should be kept in mind when judging upon the coefficients of the
foreigner variable in our estimations.
One of our motivations for using a foreigner variable is its supposed connection
with norms, tastes and social interactions. A low adherence to norms may be the
consequence of or a reaction to discriminatory tendencies against foreigners by the
native population. Moreover, concerning crime-enhancing social interactions,
foreigners are presumably more likely to become offenders, since (especially
young) foreigners spend more time in cliques.
Apart from norms, tastes and social interactions the young-men and foreigner
variables may also be related to deterrence variables, and legal and illegal income
opportunities. Young men/people, especially when they are less than 18 years of age
and/or first-time offenders, usually are not severely punished. On the other hand,
young men/people who are pupils, students or job-beginners with low wages, have
relatively low legal income opportunities. The same holds true for foreigners who
may have low-paid jobs due to language problems or lack of education. Moreover,
the physical advantages of young men increase their illegal income opportunities.
In regard to the crime statistic, gender is obviously an important factor. Less than
30% of all suspects in Germany are women, a fact that may partly be explained by
the social role of women in the society (see Eide, 1994). Statistically, women spend
more time with their children and housework. Thus they have less time and less
opportunities to commit crimes. Moreover, because of the tendency to impress
friends, crime-increasing social interactions seem to be more extensive among men.
Apart from the fact that gender is indeed an important factor of crime, its use in
regressions of the supply-of-offenses is not meaningful because there is not enough
variation in the gender variable nor between observational units nor over time.
Population density is another important determinant of crime. Big cities exhibit
much higher crime rates than smaller cities or rural areas. According to their study
for the United States, Glaeser and Sacerdote (1996) find that 45% of the crime
premium in cities is due to less intact families in large cities. (26% may be
explained by higher illegal income opportunities and 12% by the lower probability
of arrest.) Families are less intact in metropolitan areas. This fact may again be
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interpreted in the sense of dangerous social interactions. When parents lose
influence over their children’s behaviour, children are more likely to enter youth-
gangs. In our econometric analysis, we use dummy-variables to represent the crime-
effect of population density.
The majority of our descriptive analysis of crime and its factors has been carried out
on data for West Germany (11 Laender, 1975-1996) alone. Most of our estimations
are based on this dataset. The other dataset we use contains West and East German
states (16 Laender, 1993-1996). Table 2 gives an impression of the relevant
variables in a West-East-German context. The table also contains aggregated
information about the city states.
Table 2: Crime and socioeconomic conditions in West Germany, East Germany
and the City-States in 1996
Variables West Germany* City-States** East Germany***
All Crimes per 100,000 inhabitants 7,768 16,520 9,828
General Clear-up rate 50.2 44.8 44.2
Robberies per 100.000 inhabitants 81 303 89
Clear-up rate for Robbery 46.1 36.7 53.5
Thefts under aggravating circumstances
per 100.000 inhabitants
2,304 5,142 3,903
Clear-up rate for thefts under
aggravating circumstances
12.9 8.6 15.5
Murders per 100.000 inhabitants 7.9 8.0 6.0
Clear-up rate for murders 93.0 87.4 88.5
Percentage of foreign citizens in the
population
10.3 13.7 1.7
real gross domestic product per capita
in prices from 1991
41,530 48,066 18,016
unemployment rate 10,7 14,5 17,0
unemployed aged 24 or younger as a
percentage of all unemployed people
12.9 11.3 11.1
percentage of males aged 15-24 in the
population
5.6 5.4 6.4
Source: Annual crime statistic 1996 of the German Federal Criminal Police Office
(Bundeskriminalamt), anual statistic 1996 of the Federal Statistical Office of Germany
(Statistisches Bundesamt), anual labour statistic 1996 of the Federal Employment Service
(Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) and own calculations.
*West Germany includes East Berlin. **The city-states are Berlin (West and East Berlin), Bremen
and Hamburg. ***East Germany does not include East Berlin.
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3 Model Specifications and estimation methods
3.1 The basic model
The economics of crime has its origin in the well known and pathbreaking paper on
"Crime and Punishment" by Becker (1968). The main purpose of his essay is to
answer the question, how many resources and how much punishment should be
used to minimize social losses due to costs of crime (damages, cost of apprehension
and and conviction). His basic model is based on the assumption "that a person
commits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by
using his time and other resources at other activities" (Becker, 1986, p. 176).8 The
public’s decison variables are its expenditures on police, courts, the size and the
form of punishment that help to determine the individual probability of committing
a crime. Changing these factors of deterrence means that the expected payoff from
crimes and, in turn, the number of offenses will change. Becker calls this
relationship between the number of offenses and the amount of deterrence the
"supply of offenses".
Becker’s theoretical work was extended by Ehrlich (1973). By considering a time
allocation model, he motivated the introduction of indicators for legal and illegal
income opportunitues. These considerations lead to the basic Becker-Ehrlich
specification, which is commonly written in logarithmic form:
( ) ln ln ln ln ,1 O D Y X= + + +α β γ δ
where
O = crime rate,
D = deterrence,
Y = income,
X = other influences.
In our specification, as in most applications of the Becker-Ehrlich specification, we
measure deterrence by clear-up rates. A minor part of empirical investigations also
uses size and form of fines. Both are expected to have negative signs in eq. (1). We
                                                     
8
 Many applications of the Becker model state that the main purpose of his essay was to present a
microeconomic model of rational behaviour. This is not true. Though his model is based on the
central assumption of Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility which was introduced in a footnote:
Becker (1968, p. 177). Becker clearly expresses his motivation by developing "optimal public
and private policies to combat illegal behaviour" (Becker, 1968, p. 207).
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refrain from testing the effects of varying the severity of punishment, because
punishment is mainly based on federal laws.
Our specification also uses two proxies for legal and illegal income opportunities.
The first one is the usual indicator (real) GDP per head, which should, according to
Ehrlich (1973), measure illegal income opportunities. It should, therefore, have a
positive impact on the crime rate. The second one is "relative distance to average
income" (measured by ["realGDP/head" - "average real GDP/head"] / "average real
GDP/head"). Since we are dealing with panel data, this variable replaces the
variable income inequality of aggregate studies. It measures income with respect to
incumbents of average income. In a sense, one might interpret such a variable as
"envy effect". In the sense of Ehrlich (1973), for relatively poor people below the
average, expected income from legal activities is expected to be low, whereas
people from above the average have less incentives to commit a crime. Thus, the
expected sign in the supply-of-offenses function is negative.
In modern studies "other influences" have reached central attention. They are
discussed because of the sustainable growth rates of crime in western countries, and
because of recent economic and demographic problems like unemployment,
increasing income inequality, high number of foreigners, urbanization and youth
unemployment. German case studies are also faced with the problem of East/West
adjustments.
Our general specification takes these points into consideration. It can be written as
( ) ln ln ln ln ln ,2 1 2O p Y Y Xa r= + + + +α β γ γ δ
where
O = crime rate (number of offenses / 100,000 inhabitants),
p = clear-up rate ("probability of being detected"),
Ya = absolute income,
Yr = relative income,
X = unemployment, age, foreigners, urbanization,east-west differentials.
Equation (2) serves as a starting point for our econometric specification. In the
sense of Eide (1994), it should be named "criminometric" specification.
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3.2 The econometric/criminometric specification
Our data consist of a cross-section of time series from the German Laender. In order
to exploit both, the time series and cross-section variation of the data, we use
standard panel econometric techniques.
The bulk of our estimates uses the sample period 1975 to 1996. Thus, the time
series dimension is relatively large when compared to the cross-section dimension
(Germany is split up into 16 states, 11 states are in West Germany). Moreover,
demographic, econometric and criminometric time series show a trend. Thus, we are
faced with the potential problem of nonstationarity, though the length of our time
series (22 observations) does not allow for serious unit root tests because of the
very low statistical power. There are some new efforts of testing for unit roots that
exploit the cross section dimension (Levin and Lin, 1992, 1993), however these
tests are of limited practical relevance since they assume that under the null
hypothesis all times series in the cross section have the same (unit root) parameter.9
Not surprisingly, our panel-unit root tests produce ambiguous results. Although
most of the variables seem to be stationary, some variables reveal signs of
nonstationary I(1) behaviour.
In order to keep the analysis tractable, we check the robustness of our results by
continuing in two steps. First, we run a static regression using the specification
presented above. Then, in a second step, we implement the error-correction
mechanism, which is well known from dynamic time series analysis. It can be
interpreted in both stationary and nonstationary frameworks:
( ) ln (ln ln ln ln ln )
ln ln ln ln ,
3 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
1 2
∆
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
O c g O p Y Y X
ß p Y Y X
a r
a r
= + − − − −
+ + + +
− − − − −
β γ γ δ
γ γ δ
where ∆ is the difference operator. Deviations from the general equilibrium, i.e. eq.
(2), are expected to be corrected next period. Hence, g should have a negative sign.
Otherwise, there would be no convergence and the deterrence equation would not
be valid. Barred parameters show whether there are significant forces in the short
run that might lead to corrections of the crime rate.
We include dummy variables to control for unobserved heterogeneity of the German
Laender. Since they are responsible for criminal prosecution, these dummies can
cover potential differences in the efficiency and the prefences of state governments.
Moreover, in contrast to cross-sectional studies, fixed-effect modelling allows us to
control for different shares of unreported crime at the state level (if these do not
change over time).
                                                     
9
 We provide panel unit root tests in Table A2.7 in the appendix.
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4 Data
For our empirical investigations on the supply-of-offenses functions we use two
different datasets. The first one (the long panel) is an exclusively West German
panel dataset containing all 11 Laender that formed the Federal Republic of
Germany prior to the German unification in 1990. The panel is unbalanced because
reliable data for the former West Berlin is only available until 1989. All other states
are considered from 1975 to 1996.
The second dataset (short panel) contains all 16 Laender that constitute the Federal
Republic of Germany now. In the years following the reunification, there were
difficulties in the registration of crimes and clear-ups in the five New Laender (that
were part of the former German Democratic Republic). For that reason, only a
period of four years (1993-1996) can be considered in a crime-related dataset
containing all 16 Laender of Germany. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that
Berlin, which contained a West and East German part, is treated as a West German
state in our empirical analysis.10
Table 3 describes all variables that are used in our estimations. All crime and clear-
up rates are taken from the German Federal Criminal Police Office
(Bundeskriminalamt). The choice of crime categories is limited by the availability
of clear-up rates on the state level.
The variables FOREIGN (percentage of foreigners in the population), Ya (real Gross
Domestic Product  per capita in constant prices), M15-24 (percentage of males aged
15-24 in the population) and Yr (relative distance between states’ GDP and federal
GDP) result from our own calculations on the basis of Statistical Yearbooks from
the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt).
The variable UNEMPL (unemployment rate) was taken from annual reports of the
Federal Employment Service (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) and the variable
UNEMPL24 (share of unemployed persons under 25 years of age out of all
unemployed persons) is our own calculation on the basis of the periodical
"Strukturanalyse” of the same office. Since the number of unemployed persons
under 25 years of age is not available prior to 1991 at the state level the variable
UNEMPL24 can only be used for estimations based on the short panel. Since we
run exclusively fixed-effects regressions in the long panel and because the latter
consist only of West German states, the variables EAST (indicator variable for East
Germany) and CITY (indicator variable for the city-states) can only be used in the
short panel.
                                                     
10
 This can be justified by the fact that former West-Berlin is about 65% larger in population size
and 150% larger in GDP than East-Berlin. Because of the fast adjustment of East Berlin’s living
conditions to West German standards the united city may be more appropriately considered
West German than East German.
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Other variables are exclusively used in the long panel. The use of Yr in the short
panel (1993-1996) is not reasonable since the relative income measure does not
exhibit enough variation over time.
Table 3: List of variables used in regression analysis
Variables used in regressions with both datasets
O = general crime rate calculated as number of crimes known to the police per
100.000 inhabitants
Specific crime rates: Definitions are provided in appendix A1
O1
O2
O3
O4
O5
O6
O7
O8
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
robbery
theft under aggravating circumstances (will be abbreviated to theft u.a.c. in the
course of the paper)
theft without aggravating circumstances (will be abbreviated to theft w.a.c. in the
course of the paper)
fraud
murder and manslaughter
rape
dangerous and serious assault
damage to property
p = percentage of crimes cleared up by the police
p1-p8 = specific clear-up ratios
FOREIGN = percentage of foreign citiziens in the population
Ya = real gross domestic product per capita in prices from 1991
UNEMPL = unemployment rate
M15-24 = percentage of males aged 15-24 in the population
Variables used only in regressions with the long panel (1975-1996)
Yr = difference between real gross domestic product per capita in the particular state
and the West German average as a percentage of the West German average
∗
-1 = one year lagged values of the variables mentioned above
∆∗ = first differences of the variables mentioned above
Variables used only in regressions with the short panel (1993-1996)
EAST = dummy variable that is 1 if the state belongs to the territory of the former German
Democratic Republic and 0 otherwise. Since East- and West-Berlin can only be
jointly considered, united Berlin is treated as a West German state.
CITY = dummy variable that is 1 if the state is a so-called ″City-State″ and 0 otherwise.
The City-States are Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen.
UNEMPL24 = unemployed aged 24 or younger as a percentage of all unemployed people
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5 Results
Our results are based on static and dynamic ECM panel data modelling. Table 4
presents static fixed-effect estimations for annual data of the West German states,
1975-1996. Table 5 reveals the corresponding ECM specification, whereas Table 6
shows results for united Germany, 1993-1996. The relatively short period of the last
sample is the result of unreliable crime data for East Germany before 1993.
According to notes given in our data source (BKA, Polizeistatistik 1996), East
German police statistics of the years 1990 to 1992 are biased due to administrative
adjustment problems during the first years after German unification (and data from
the former German Democratic Republic are not comparable with West German
data before 1990). We first comment on results presented in Table 4 and 5. After
this, we check whether the results hold for recent data of unified Germany.
As in most empirical studies investigating aggregate crime, the effect of the
deterrence variable p has the correct negative sign. The aggregate parameter is -0.20
in the static framework and -0.28 in the ECM model. 11 It is somewhat smaller than
the median elasiticity of about -0.5 that is given in Eide (1997), who summarizes the
estimates of 21 international cross section studies based on a variety of model
specifications, types of data and regression techniques. The deterrence hypothesis
works quite well for crime against property, in particular theft u.a.c. and robbery. A
wrong sign, however, is found for fraud, though the parameter becomes
insignificant in Table 5, where ECM-dynamics are taken into account.12
The demographic factors reveal important and significant influences. Relatively
large young cohorts (we measure the relative size of the group 15 to 24 years old)
increase crime rates in the majority of crime categories. Looking at the size of the
parameter, we find, perhaps not surprisingly, that theft u.a.c. reacts mainly to the
number of young people (elasticities in Tables 4 and 5, resp.: 1.0, 1.2). Urbanization
effects are covered by fixed effects (i.e. the effect of states which are highly
significant in all specifications). We first started by directly considering population
density. It was highly significant with expected higher crime rates in densely
populated areas. Then we added fixed effects. They remained significant, but
population density became insignificant. We conclude that fixed effects cover
population density but that they contain unobserved heterogeneity not measured by
population density alone. Thus, we stay with fixed effects only. The positive impact
of foreigners on crime rates is significant at a first glance (see Table 4). However,
significance levels may be biased due to serial correlation, as is suggested by the
                                                     
11
 In order to investigate potential biases due to the simultaneity between crime and clear-up rates,
we have run regressions with delayed clear-up ratios. As can be seen by the comparison of
Table 4 and Table A2.1, estimated coefficients do not differ significantly.
12
 Positive sign in the supply of offenses function would indicate risk-loving criminals, inferiority
of leisure or the endowment income effect of the Slutsky-equation (known from the reasoning
behind the backward-bending labour-supply curve) (see Entorf, 1998 for details).
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low BFN-DW-statistic13 for panel data in Table 4. In Table 5, we observe that
among the various types of crime only theft u.a.c. and w.a.c. remain significant. In
particular, there is no significant difference to Germans with respect to crime
against the person. Thus, since theft is the category closest to the rational offender,
one might conclude that foreigners commit crime for economic reasons. Of course,
such conclusions can only be preliminary and would need more (micro) studies that
can control for individual effects such as neighbourhood and social interaction.
Absolute income, measured by GDP p.c., is used as an indicator of illegal income
opportunities. In the sense of Ehrlich (1973), it is an indicator for the value of
wealth within the area of potential criminal activies (here: within states). The higher
potential gains are, the higher are the crime rates. In fact, for all types of crime
except "rape" and "murder" the absolute income variable has positive signs. The
positive effect for murder can also be found in the analysis of international data (see
Brantingham and Easton, 1996, Entorf, 1996). Somewhat surprising is the positive
sign of assault. The lower income is compared to average income, the lower are
potential legal income opportunities within the neighbourhood area (Ehrlich, 1973).
For the rational offender, low legal income opportunities increase the probability of
committing a crime. In fact, most of the estimates confirm the theoretically expected
negative sign for relative income (exceptions rape, murder), though the ECM
framework reveals insignificance in 5 out of 8 categories. (Since one might suspect
that the opposite signs of both income variables are the result of collinearity, we
have omitted relative income in Tables A2.2, A2.4 and absolute income in Tables
A2.3 and A2.5. Results reveal robust signs of both income variables. Of course,
there will be different parameters because of the omitted variable bias).
Unemployment, finally, shows small, often insignificant and ambiguous signs. In
the ECM framework, only theft w.a.c., fraud and rape are significant, but the signs
(negative for rape and theft) are hard to explain in a conventional framework. There
are, however, explanations given by criminologists (Sutherland and Cressey, 1974)
predicting that employment increases delinquent behaviour by exposing individuals
to a wider network of peers (see Ploeger, 1997, for empirical evidence).
Completing our conclusions based on Table 5, we observe significant and correctly
signed ECM parameters (i.e. the parameter g in eq. 3). They range between -0.25
(assault) and -0.68 (aggregate category), indicating a relatively quick convergence
to equilibrium. Differenced variables representing short-run corrections of
disequilibrium situations mostly reveal no significant differences when compared to
the long-run equilibrium behaviour. An exception is the lack of significance of
absolute and relative income variables. Evidently, the potential offenders’
perception of legal and illegal income opportunities does not change with temporary
                                                     
13
 Bhargava, Franzini, Narendranathan (1982) simulate and tabulate critical values for different N,
T and numbers of regressors.
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income fluctuations. Only permanent income changes determine the (long-run)
development of crime.
Table 6 reveals that the impact of unemployment is higher and positive throughout
in recent unified Germany. Moreover, economic reasons become clearer than in the
previous sample. The "economic" categories robbery and theft u.a.c. have high
elasticities about one or above. (We only run static regressions, so corresponding t-
values could be misleading. However, since we only have 4 years of observations,
and only small variation in some of the variables, ECM modelling would not make
sense).
Table 6 distinguishes between being "young" and being "young and
unemployed".There is no clear result indicating that it is exclusively the fact of
being "young and unemployed" that leads to crime. Even after controlling for the
possibility of being in the group of young unemployed, simply being young is more
often associated with theft u.a.c. and w.a.c., rape and assault than being in other age
groups. Nevertheless, there are clear signs that being young and unemployed
increases the probability of committing a crime. In all categories this variable has
positive effects and in 5 out of 8 categories the t-value is above 1.94.
With respect to the probability of being detected, the deterrence parameter seems to
be higher than in Tables 4 and 5 (theft u.a.c.: -0.60, theft w.a.c.:-0.91, robbery: even
-1.20). With the exception of the surprisingly high estimate for murder (-1.94), the
estimates confirm the better performance of the deterrence hypothesis for crime
against property.
Income is only measured in terms of absolute income. In the short panel, there is not
enough variation among relative income and absolute income to allow for both
types of income. The missing variable might be the reason for the very small and
insignificant effect for the aggregate category. The positive signs for crimes against
property (robbery, theft, fraud), however, are confirmed.
Crimes against property also is the "favoured" crime in East Germany, as can be
seen from the dummy variable for East German states. All types of crime except
assault reveal higher crime rates than for West German states. The biggest
difference can be detected for robbery, where (cet. par.) East German states have
more than 120% higher crime rates than West German non-city states.
The remaining variables do not reveal any surprises. CITY measures the (higher)
crime premium in "city-states" (Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg). As before, FOREIGN,
is associated with positive but not necessarily significant crime effects.
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Table 4: Estimates of the supply-of-offenses functions: West Germany 1975-1996
Dependent variables
Independent variables
lnO
(1)
All crimes
lnO1
(2)
Robbery
lnO2
(3)
Theft u.a.c.
lnO3
(4)
Theft w.a.c
lnO4
(5)
Fraud
Constant -1.93*
(-3.74)
-0.66
(-0.46)
1.75*
(2.03)
1.18
(1.68)
-12.96*
(-5.58)
lnp, lnp1-lnp4 -0.20*
(-3.43)
-0.74*
(-7.72)
-0.43*
(-12.43)
-0.08
(-0.77)
1.12*
(4.07)
lnFOREIGN 0.35*
(9.80)
0.99*
(10.77)
0.42*
(7.42)
0.49*
(9.53)
0.26*
(2.16)
lnYa 0.89*
(19.56)
0.40*
(3.33)
0.34*
(4.24)
0.41*
(4.80)
1.23*
(7.91)
lnYr -1.12*
(-9.68)
-0.73*
(-2.35)
-0.90*
(-4.71)
-0.39*
(-2.12)
-1.02*
(-2.68)
lnUNEMPL 0.04*
(2.95)
0.01
(0.25)
0.08*
(3.51)
-0.14*
(-5.43)
0.37*
(7.62)
lnM15-24 0.54*
(14.38)
0.38*
(4.12)
1.01*
(17.08)
0.66*
(12.41)
-0.05
(-0.37)
Baden-Württemberg -0.07*
(-2.77)
-0.16*
(-2.78)
0.11*
(2.84)
-0.18*
(-5.51)
0.17*
(2.26)
Berlin 0.88*
(27.25)
1.02*
(13.31)
1.25*
(26.61)
0.77*
(18.72)
0.53*
(5.64)
Bremen 0.90*
(22.12)
1.30*
(15.81)
1.46*
(27.17)
0.88*
(19.97)
0.56*
(5.49)
Hamburg 0.93*
(16.90)
1.31*
(9.77)
1.48*
(18.63)
0.81*
(11.64)
0.93*
(5.90)
Hesse 0.23*
(7.62)
0.25*
(3.95)
0.70*
(18.74)
0.10*
(2.81)
0.22*
(3.02)
Lower Saxony 0.40*
(11.81)
0.86*
(11.52)
0.89*
(19.14)
0.57*
(12.11)
0.15
(1.46)
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.20*
(8.33)
0.33*
(7.78)
0.76*
(29.46)
0.19*
(7.24)
0.02
(0.39)
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.14*
(5.74)
0.42*
(7.01)
0.46*
(12.47)
0.25*
(6.11)
0.19*
(2.41)
Saarland 0.16*
(5.44)
0.65*
(9.63)
0.39*
(9.43)
0.46*
(10.23)
-0.28*
(-3.05)
Schleswig-Holstein 0.66*
(17.14)
1.02*
(11.94)
1.10*
(20.84)
0.89*
(15.76)
0.27*
(2.29)
Adjusted R-squared 0.986 0.965 0.982 0.959 0.903
Sum of squared residuals 0.049 0.123 0.076 0.070 0.158
BFN-DW-statistic 1.12 0.82 1.04 0.76 0.83
Wald test on fixed effects 3117.26 847.26 3201.38 1887.29 266.39
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Table 4: continued
Dependent variables
Independent variables
lnO
(6)
All crimes
lnO5
(7)
Murder
lnO6
(8)
Rape
lnO7
(9)
Assault
lnO8
(10)
Vandalism
Constant -1.93*
(-3.74)
9.87*
(4.37)
11.75*
(8.86)
-8.72*
(-4.92)
-3.41*
(-2.22)
lnp, lnp5-lnp8 -0.20*
(-3.43)
-0.64*
(-1.99)
-0.41*
(-3.43)
0.86*
(3.28)
-0.27*
(-3.36)
lnFOREIGN 0.35*
(9.80)
0.23
(1.90)
0.42*
(4.86)
0.44*
(5.37)
0.20*
(2.55)
lnYa 0.89*
(19.56)
-0.64*
(-4.25)
-0.95*
(-8.61)
0.74*
(7.57)
0.88*
(6.78)
lnYr -1.12*
(-9.68)
0.08
(0.22)
0.42
(1.48)
-1.23*
(-4.78)
-1.19*
(-4.62)
lnUNEMPL 0.04*
(2.95)
0.08
(1.60)
-0.18*
(-5.00)
-0.05
(-1.52)
0.00
(-0.04)
lnM15-24 0.54*
(14.38)
0.25*
(2.06)
0.72*
(7.98)
0.38*
(4.74)
0.39*
(3.99)
Baden-Württemberg -0.07*
(-2.77)
0.08
(1.00)
-0.05
(-0.91)
-0.20*
(-3.98)
-0.10*
(-2.00)
Berlin 0.88*
(27.25)
0.53*
(5.64)
0.91*
(11.74)
1.32*
(17.64)
0.87*
(14.58)
Bremen 0.90*
(22.12)
0.90*
(8.84)
1.20*
(15.07)
1.09*
(13.73)
0.74*
(11.92)
Hamburg* 0.93*
(16.90)
0.46*
(2.89)
1.16*
(9.75)
0.74*
(6.55)
0.73*
(7.65)
Hesse 0.23*
(7.62)
0.34*
(4.62)
0.19*
(3.25)
-0.01
(-0.25)
0.20*
(4.04)
Lower Saxony 0.40*
(11.81)
0.19
(1.90)
0.44*
(6.12)
0.27*
(4.27)
0.32*
(5.28)
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.20*
(8.33)
-0.14*
(-2.60)
0.11*
(2.82)
0.23*
(6.36)
0.14*
(3.95)
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.14*
(5.74)
0.29*
(3.66)
0.21*
(3.72)
0.08
(1.55)
0.06
(1.17)
Saarland 0.16*
(5.44)
0.26*
(2.93)
0.18*
(2.74)
0.36*
(6.32)
0.23*
(4.07)
Schleswig-Holstein 0.66*
(17.14)
-0.05
(-0.41)
0.50*
(6.14)
0.53*
(6.85)
0.71*
(10.29)
Adjusted R-squared 0.986 0.732 0.921 0.933 0.925
Sum of squared residuals 0.049 0.161 0.112 0.103 0.090
BFN-DW-statistic 1.12 1.06 1.04 0.49 0.65
Wald test on fixed effects 3117.26 362.33 558.46 972.79 940.40
Note: Nobs. is 235, 202 for vandalism. "Bavaria" represents the reference state dummy variable.
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Table 5: ECM-estimates of the supply-of-offenses functions: West Germany 1975-1996
Dependent variables
Independent variables
lnO
(1)
All crimes
lnO1
(2)
Robbery
lnO2
(3)
Theft u.a.c.
lnO3
(4)
Theft w.a.c
lnO4
(5)
Fraud
lnO
-1, lnO1-1-lnO4-1 -0.68*
(-11.56)
-0.34*
(-6.30)
-0.54*
(-9.19)
-0.47*
(-8.82)
-0.45*
(-7.82)
Constant -1.49
(-1.57)
-11.65*
(-2.50)
2.03
(1.04)
2.62
(1.49)
-12.29*
(-2.00)
lnp
-1, lnp1-1-lnp4-1 -0.28*
(-3.67)
-1.52*
(-5.94)
-0.42*
(-7.32)
-0.08
(-0.40)
0.95
(1.54)
lnFOREIGN
-1 0.21*
(3.82)
0.35
(1.39)
0.32*
(3.01)
0.28*
(2.89)
0.27
(0.96)
lnYa
-1 0.93*
(10.09)
1.93*
(4.08)
0.30
(1.59)
0.38*
(2.09)
1.26*
(2.65)
lnYr
-1 -1.24*
(-7.77)
-2.59*
(-3.27)
-1.15*
(-3.50)
-0.50
(-1.58)
-1.22
(-1.50)
lnUNEMPL
-1 0.05
(1.81)
-0.08
(-0.67)
0.00
(-0.02)
-0.13*
(-2.57)
0.25*
(2.06)
lnM15-24
-1 0.43*
(7.85)
0.16
(0.66)
1.20*
(10.64)
0.31*
(2.99)
-0.06
(-0.20)
Baden-Württemberg -0.01
(-0.20)
0.02
(0.17)
0.15*
(2.22)
-0.08
(-1.34)
0.14
(0.81)
Berlin 0.94*
(21.57)
1.23*
(6.55)
1.39*
(17.00)
0.85*
(11.80)
0.66*
(3.32)
Bremen 0.90*
(16.41)
1.40*
(6.82)
1.63*
(17.82)
0.91*
(12.09)
0.64*
(3.05)
Hamburg 0.97*
(13.42)
1.26*
(3.90)
1.73*
(12.99)
0.89*
(7.74)
1.02*
(3.17)
Hesse 0.27*
(6.74)
0.33*
(2.29)
0.81*
(12.69)
0.18*
(2.84)
0.25
(1.70)
Lower Saxony 0.31*
(6.60)
0.50*
(2.73)
0.85*
(10.52)
0.44*
(5.41)
0.21
(0.97)
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.21*
(6.76)
0.44*
(4.58)
0.83*
(19.49)
0.23*
(4.97)
0.10
(0.93)
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.09*
(2.65)
0.17
(1.23)
0.42*
(6.90)
0.16*
(2.31)
0.24
(1.47)
Saarland 0.09*
(2.22)
0.39*
(2.45)
0.37*
(5.04)
0.37*
(4.67)
-0.23
(-1.17)
Schleswig-Holstein 0.54*
(9.90)
0.48*
(2.20)
1.04*
(11.11)
0.72*
(7.17)
0.31
(1.15)
∆p, ∆p1-∆p4 -0.12
(-1.81)
-0.22*
(-2.19)
-0.16*
(-3.58)
0.16
(1.78)
0.63*
(2.37)
∆FOREIGN 0.18*
(2.41)
0.11
(0.63)
0.38*
(3.22)
0.23*
(2.35)
-0.21
(-0.84)
∆Ya -0.09
(-0.67)
0.23
(0.76)
-0.35
(-1.59)
-0.28
(-1.56)
0.08
(0.17)
∆Yr 0.00
(0.56)
0.00
(-0.23)
0.00
(0.41)
0.00
(0.20)
-0.02
(-0.72)
∆UNEMPL 0.07*
(2.80)
0.06
(1.10)
0.06
(1.51)
-0.08*
(-2.48)
0.31*
(3.68)
∆M15-24 0.53*
(3.07)
1.52*
(3.64)
0.31
(1.11)
0.68*
(2.76)
-0.07
(-0.12)
Adjusted R-squared 0.512 0.244 0.498 0.419 0.249
Sum of squared residuals 0.038 0.083 0.060 0.049 0.127
BFN-DW-statistic 1.89 1.93 1.78 1.86 2.13
Wald test on fixed effects 1818.87 135.10 1244.77 593.62 83.16
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Table 5: continued
Dependent variables
Independent variables
lnO
(6)
All crimes
lnO5
(7)
Murder
lnO6
(8)
Rape
lnO7
(9)
Assault
lnO8
(10)
Vandalism
lnO
-1, lnO5-1-lnO8-1 -0.68*
(-11.56)
-0.54*
(-8.42)
-0.51*
(-7.78)
-0.25*
(-5.87)
-0.27*
(-4.68)
Constant -1.49
(-1.57)
1.60
(0.27)
9.71*
(2.74)
-16.50*
(-3.27)
5.34
(0.66)
lnp
-1, lnp5-1-lnp8-1 -0.28*
(-3.67)
-0.30
(-0.38)
-0.43
(-1.51)
-0.09
(-0.12)
0.03
(0.11)
lnFOREIGN
-1 0.21*
(3.82)
0.38
(1.43)
0.17
(0.84)
-0.04
(-0.14)
0.15
(0.55)
lnYa
-1 0.93*
(10.09)
-0.08
(-0.18)
-0.64
(-1.89)
2.09*
(4.73)
0.06
(0.08)
lnYr
-1 -1.24*
(-7.77)
-0.97
(-1.26)
0.23
(0.38)
-2.30*
(-3.32)
-0.49
(-0.51)
lnUNEMPL
-1 0.05
(1.81)
-0.07
(-0.56)
-0.18*
(-2.01)
-0.09
(-0.89)
0.02
(0.18)
lnM15-24
-1 0.43*
(7.85)
0.65*
(2.47)
0.42*
(2.03)
-0.15
(-0.64)
-0.10
(-0.29)
Baden-Württemberg -0.01
(-0.20)
0.00
(0.02)
0.03
(0.27)
0.00
(-0.04)
0.02
(0.15)
Berlin 0.94*
(21.57)
0.60*
(3.34)
0.97*
(6.01)
1.31*
(6.84)
0.94*
(4.91)
Bremen 0.90*
(16.41)
1.09*
(5.52)
1.20*
(7.18)
0.90*
(4.37)
0.81*
(4.26)
Hamburg 0.97*
(13.42)
0.66*
(2.23)
1.15*
(4.82)
0.46
(1.55)
0.87*
(3.09)
Hesse 0.27*
(6.74)
0.36*
(2.71)
0.23*
(2.07)
0.04
(0.33)
0.23
(1.54)
Lower Saxony 0.31*
(6.60)
0.24
(1.25)
0.33*
(2.19)
0.16
(0.95)
0.28
(1.48)
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.21*
(6.76)
-0.13
(-1.29)
0.16*
(2.12)
0.33*
(3.87)
0.17
(1.64)
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.09*
(2.65)
0.30*
(2.11)
0.14
(1.27)
0.04
(0.32)
0.08
(0.52)
Saarland 0.09*
(2.22)
0.29
(1.69)
0.08
(0.58)
0.38*
(2.47)
0.20
(1.13)
Schleswig-Holstein 0.54*
(9.90)
-0.01
(-0.06)
0.35*
(1.98)
0.22
(1.01)
0.65*
(2.94)
∆p, ∆p5-∆p8 -0.12
(-1.81)
-0.32
(-1.07)
-0.33*
(-2.71)
-0.35
(-1.50)
0.02
(0.33)
∆FOREIGN 0.18*
(2.41)
0.11
(0.38)
0.06
(0.28)
0.03
(0.22)
0.25
(1.78)
∆Ya -0.09
(-0.67)
-0.19
(-0.35)
-0.36
(-0.95)
0.16
(0.77)
-0.12
(-0.47)
∆Yr 0.00
(0.56)
-0.01
(-0.45)
0.01
(0.31)
0.00
(0.36)
0.02
(1.80)
∆UNEMPL 0.07*
(2.80)
0.07
(0.74)
-0.02
(-0.35)
-0.04
(-1.03)
-0.09
(-1.93)
∆M15-24 0.53*
(3.07)
0.40
(0.59)
0.82
(1.70)
1.34*
(5.07)
0.17
(0.42)
Adjusted R-squared 0.512 0.238 0.222 0.300 0.216
Sum of squared residuals 0.038 0.143 0.105 0.057 0.061
BFN-DW-statistic 1.89 2.08 2.03 1.98 2.01
Wald test on fixed effects 1818.87 130.42 122.92 172.45 113.49
Note: Nobs. is 224, 191 for vandalism. "Bavaria" represents the reference state dummy variable.
29
Ta
bl
e 6
: E
st
im
a
te
s 
o
f t
he
 
su
pp
ly
-o
f-o
ffe
n
se
s 
fu
nc
tio
ns
: G
er
m
a
n
y 
19
93
-1
99
6
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
es
ln
O (1)
Al
l c
rim
es
ln
O
1
(2)
R
ob
be
ry
ln
O
2
(3)
Th
ef
t u
.a
.c
.
ln
O
3
(4)
Th
ef
t w
.
a
.c
ln
O
4
(5) Fr
a
u
d
ln
O
5
(6)
M
ur
de
r
ln
O
6
(7) Ra
pe
ln
O
7
(8)
As
sa
ul
t
ln
O
8
(9)
Va
nd
al
ism
Co
ns
ta
nt
6.
65
*
(2.
35
)
-
2.
98
(-0
.8
6)
-
4.
76
(-1
.
09
)
0.
33
(0.
16
)
-
0.
37
(-0
.1
2)
5.
43
(1.
84
)
-
9.
47
*
(-3
.1
6)
0.
58
(0.
14
)
3.
86
(1.
11
)
EA
ST
0.
44
*
(2.
05
)
1.
28
*
(4.
93
)
0.
95
*
(2.
73
)
0.
33
*
(2.
02
)
0.
54
(1.
87
)
0.
53
*
(2.
17
)
0.
57
*
(2.
53
)
-
0.
72
*
(-3
.1
2)
0.
31
(1.
08
)
CI
TY
0.
60
*
(6.
26
)
0.
77
*
(5.
95
)
0.
44
*
(2.
53
)
0.
54
*
(6.
94
)
0.
69
*
(5.
77
)
0.
45
*
(3.
30
)
0.
94
*
(8.
49
)
0.
64
*
(3.
93
)
0.
58
*
(4.
46
)
ln
p,
 ln
p1
-ln
p8
-
0.
65
*
(-3
.
73
)
-
1.
20
*
(-5
.7
2)
-
0.
60
*
(-3
.
83
)
-
0.
91
*
(-5
.3
4)
-
0.
02
(-0
.0
8)
-
1.
94
*
(-7
.
08
)
0.
18
(0.
66
)
0.
87
(1.
30
)
0.
23
(1.
16
)
ln
FO
R
EI
G
N
0.
22
*
(2.
61
)
0.
44
*
(4.
16
)
0.
36
*
(2.
54
)
0.
07
(0.
97
)
0.
21
(1.
91
)
0.
33
*
(3.
25
)
0.
23
*
(2.
51
)
0.
23
*
(2.
35
)
0.
20
(1.
60
)
ln
Ya
0.
03
(0.
15
)
0.
43
*
(2.
00
)
0.
18
(0.
62
)
0.
47
*
(3.
25
)
0.
36
(1.
65
)
-
0.
10
(-0
.
43
)
0.
21
(1.
12
)
-
0.
50
*
(-2
.5
5)
-
0.
34
(-1
.
44
)
ln
UN
EM
PL
0.
41
*
(2.
33
)
1.
13
*
(5.
57
)
1.
25
*
(4.
50
)
0.
67
*
(5.
12
)
0.
30
(1.
45
)
0.
45
*
(2.
29
)
0.
31
(1.
73
)
0.
99
*
(5.
34
)
0.
67
*
(2.
95
)
ln
UN
EM
PL
24
0.
67
(1.
38
)
1.
29
*
(2.
25
)
1.
95
*
(2.
45
)
0.
72
(1.
94
)
0.
78
(1.
35
)
1.
63
*
(2.
98
)
1.
95
*
(3.
92
)
0.
23
(0.
45
)
0.
92
(1.
46
)
ln
M
15
-2
4
0.
75
(1.
59
)
0.
12
(0.
21
)
1.
98
*
(2.
57
)
1.
29
*
(3.
39
)
0.
02
(0.
04
)
-
0.
10
(-0
.
17
)
1.
18
*
(2.
32
)
1.
30
*
(2.
45
)
0.
67
(1.
03
)
Ad
jus
te
d 
R-
sq
ua
re
d
0.
82
4
0.
92
1
0.
79
0
0.
86
7
0.
77
6
0.
79
6
0.
83
8
0.
79
8
0.
66
8
Su
m
 
o
f s
qu
ar
e
d 
re
si
du
al
s
0.
15
2
0.
18
8
0.
25
1
0.
12
2
0.
19
0
0.
18
2
0.
16
7
0.
17
2
0.
21
1
D
W
 
st
a
tis
tic
0.
62
0.
95
0.
85
1.
11
0.
64
0.
93
1.
24
0.
65
0.
49
N
ot
e:
 n
um
be
r o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 is
 6
4.
30
6 Conclusions
In this paper we estimate supply-of-offenses functions for aggregated crime and for
eight different crime categories using panal data of the German Laender. We
consider three groups of independent variables in our econometric/criminometric
specifications: deterrence, economic and socio-demographic variables. The results
confirm Becker’s (1968) deterrence hypothesis for crime against property, though
only weak support can be observed for crime against the person.
Economic variables that are used to measure legal and illegal income opportunities
perform well in estimations for crime against property. As already suggested by
Ehrlich (1973), absolute income turns out to be a measure of illegal rather than
legal income opportunities (i.e. higher income is associated with higher crime
rates). Results based on relative income show that a widening income gap with
respect to richer regions increases the probability of delinquent behaviour. Thus,
growing inequality seems to be an important factor of crime.
As regards crime in the eastern and western part of Germany, there remains a
higher crime rate in the east, even after controlling for differences in legal and
illegal income opportunities and other factors of crime. The reason for this is not
clear. Possibly, prosecution of crime and administration of justice are still organized
inefficiently in eastern Germany. An other explanation might be that the newly
gained freedom has led to (temporarily?) higher violation of social norms. However,
a reasonable explanation of the east-west crime differential would need further
research.
Demographic factors reveal important and significant influences. As usually found
in the literature, we observe higher crime rates in highly urbanized areas. Moreover,
we confirm the ambigous result for general unemployment. However, being young
and unemployed increases the probability of committing crimes. Additionally, also
simply being young aggravates the danger of getting into the bad company of a
group with harmful social interactions. Interpreting the influence of the aggregate
share of foreigners is difficult in aggregate studies and can only be tentative. Our
results suggest that the share of foreigners in Germany is positively associated with
crime against property, in particular theft. For all other types of crime, the effect is
not clear or insignificant.
Our analysis has left us with many new questions. Future research should pay more
attention to social and demographic influences of crime, especially in the light of
familiy background and social interactions. The practicability of this task is of
course closely related to the need for less aggregated data.
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Appendix
A1 Definitions of crime categories
In this part of the appendix we present the definitions of the eight crime categories
used in the estimations according to the German "Strafgesetzbuch" (StGB) i.e. penal
code. If categories consist of several related offenses all relevant sections of the
penal code will be presented.
Murder and Manslaughter
• Murder: (§211 StGB) the killing of a human being to satisfy homicidal desires,
sexual instincts, greed or other low motives in ways which are malicious, cruel or
dangerous to the public or to make another criminal act possible or to conceal it.
• Manslaughter: (§212 & 213 StGB) the killing of a human being without
intention or malice; also if provoked by actions and insults of the victim.
• Assisted Suicide: (§216 StGB; homicide on demand) the killing of a human
being at the express and earnest request of that person.
Rape
• Rape: (§177 StGB) the forcing of a woman to sexual intercourse outside of her
marriage with the perpetrator or a third person through the use of or threat of a
present danger to her body or life. (Sexual intercourse without valid consent.)
Robbery
• Robbery: (§249 StGB) the taking away of someone else’s property through the
use of or threat of a present danger to the body or life.
• Aggravated Robbery: (§250 StGB) if the perpetrator of the robbery or other
participant to the robbery: carries a firearm; or, carries a weapon or other tool to
overcome the resistance of another by force or the threat of force; or, brings
someone in danger of death or serious bodily harm through the robbery; or, commits
robbery as a member of or with a member of a gang formed for the purpose of
committing theft or robbery.
• Robbery resulting in Death: (§251 StGB) if the perpetrator of the robbery leads
to the careless death of another.
• Theft with Elements of Robbery: (§252 StGB) if a perpetrator, discovered in the
act of theft, takes possession of a stolen good through the use of or threat of a
present danger to the body or life of another.
• Blackmail with Elements of Robbery: (§255 StGB) if the perpetrator blackmails a
person through the use of or threat of a present danger to the body or life of another.
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Dangerous and Serious Assault
• Dangerous Assault: (§223a StGB) assault using a weapon, especially a knife or
other dangerous tool, or using a deceitful attack or a group or methods to endanger
the life of someone.
• Serious Assault: (§224 StGB; maiming) assault resulting in: the loss of a limb,
sight in one or both eyes, hearing, speech, or the ability to procreate; or, the long
term distortion of such; or, a state of sickness, paralysis, or mental illness. Includes
both (§225 parts 1&2 StGB; "Particularly Serious Assault") negligent/unintentional
and intentional bodily harm.
• Participation in a Fight: (§227 StGB) the participation in a fight or an attack by
several perpetrators which resulted in the death of a person or in serious bodily
harm (§224 StGB).
• Poisoning: (§229 StGB) the administration of a poison, or other substances that
can destroy one’s health, upon someone with the intention of damaging their health.
Theft without Aggravating Circumstances (Theft w.a.c.)
• Theft: (§242 StGB) the taking away of someone else’s property with the
intention of illegally appropriating the item.
• Home and Family Theft: (§247 StGB) if the victims of theft or embezzlement are
relatives, guardians or members of the perpetrator’s household, the case is
prosecuted only if a claim is filed.
• Petty Theft and Embezzlement: (§248a StGB) if the items stolen or embezzled
are of minute value, the case is pursued only if a claim is filed.
• Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle: (§248b StGB) the use of a motor vehicle or
bicycle without the consent of the authorized user / owner.
• Tapping of Electrical Power: (§248c StGB) the tapping of electrical systems or
installations with the intention of illegally appropriating electrical power.
Theft under Aggravating Circumstances (Theft u.a.c.)
• Aggravated Theft: (§243 StGB, "Particularly Serious Case of Theft") if the
perpetrator of a theft: 1) breaks into, climbs into or otherwise enters a building,
residence, office, business or other closed space or if the perpetrator uses a fake key
or other tool to gain entry or hides in the space; or 2) steals an item which had been
protected against theft by a closed container or other security measure; or 3) steals
as a vocation; or 4) steals an item used in religious ceremonies or services from a
church or other building or space used for religious purposes; or 5) steals an item of
scientific, artistic or historical significance or importance to technological
development found in a public collection or on public display; or 6) steals by taking
advantage of someone’s helplessness or an accident or other danger; or 7) steals a
firearm for which a permit is necessary, or a machine gun, or a fully or semi-
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automatic rifle, or explosive weapon of war (as defined by the War Weapons
Control Law).
• Theft with Weapons, Gang Theft: (§244 StGB) theft in which: 1) the perpetrator
or other participant carries a firearm; or 2) the perpetrator or other participant
carries a weapon or other tool or item to prevent or overcome the resistance of
another through force or the threat of force; or 3) the perpetrator, as a member of a
gang formed to steal and rob, steals with the assistance of another gang member.
• Serious Gang Theft: (§244a StGB) theft in which the perpetrator, as a member of
a gang formed to steal and rob, with the assistance of another gang member meets
the requirements of §243 paragraph 1, part 2 StGB or §244 paragraph 1, number 1
or 2, StGB.
Fraud
• Fraud: (§263 StGB) the acquisition of someone else’s property for one’s own
illegal enrichment or that of a third party by deception or by suppression of true
facts.
• Computer Fraud: (§263a StGB) the acquisition of someone else’s property for
one’s own illegal enrichment or that of a third party through the results of a
computerized process by means of the incorrect creation of a programme, the use of
inaccurate or incomplete data, the unauthorized use of data, or the unauthorized
influence on the course of a computerized process.
• Subsidy Fraud: (§264 StGB) the acquisition of subsidies by reporting deceptive,
incorrect, or incomplete facts or by withholding information. The abuse of office or
assistance through the abuse of office is considered Serious Subsidy Fraud.
Subsidies are payments out of public moneys to businesses or entrepreneurs which
are based on Federal, State, or European Community Rights and are in part granted
without an exchange of services and are meant to promote the economic activity.
• Investment Fraud: (§264a StGB) the misrepresentation of material facts or the
withholding of negative material facts necessary to the investment decision in
prospectuses, presentations, or overviews in the sales and offerings of stocks,
options, or shares which allow the participation in the results of a company.
• Insurance Fraud: (§265 StGB) the intentional, fraudulent damage to a fire
insured property through arson or to an insured ship or its cargo through sinking or
beaching.
• Fraudulent Acquisition of Services: (§265a StGB) the acquisition of the services
of a vending machine or of public broadcasting installations or of public
transportation or of entry to an event or exhibit without payment.
• Credit Fraud: (§265b StGB) the misrepresentation of business facts or the use of
false or incomplete information in order to obtain credit for a business.
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Vandalism (Damage to Property)
• Vandalism: (§303 StGB) the illegal damage to or destruction of someone else’s
property.
• Data Manipulation: (§303a StGB) the illegal erasure, suppression, change, or
making unusable of data.
• Computer Sabotage: (§303b StGB) the disruption of data processing that is of
considerable significance to someone else’s firm, business, or office through illegal
erasure, suppression, change, or making unusable of data.
• Claims: (§303c StGB) the crimes described in sections 303 to 303b are only
prosecuted if a claim is filed, unless the prosecutor finds a particular public interest
in pursuing the case.
• Vandalism of Public or Community Property: (§304 StGB) the illegal damage to
or destruction of: items in tribute to a state-recognized church or items used in
religious services; or grave markers, public monuments, natural monuments; or
artistic, scientific, or trade works which are part of public collections or public
exhibits; or items meant to serve the public good or the beautification of public
paths, places, or parks.
• Destruction of Public Works or Buildings: (§305 StGB) the illegal complete or
partial destruction of a building, bridge, dam, paved road, railway, or other structure
which is someone else’s property.
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Table A2.7: Panel unit root tests
Inclusion of an aggregate
intercept
Inclusion of state-specific
intercepts
Variables DF-tests ADF(1)-tests DF-tests ADF(1)-tests
O -2,37* -2,04 -8,89* -8,81*
O1 -4,30* -2,57* -8,30* -5,47*
O2 -1,17 -0,31 -4,18 -2,40
O3 1,21 0,99 -1,93 -2,84
O4 -2,11* -2,15* -5,18 -5,93*
O5 -0,84 -1,26 -7,25* -7,67*
O6 -1,89 -1,48 -9,64* -9,04*
O7 -3,07* -2,59* -5,25 -4,37
O8 -2,26* -2,09* -6,79* -7,14*
p -1,89 -1,54 -6,10* -5,91*
p1 -9,39* -6,18* -11,93* -8,73*
p2 -6,39* -3,58* -9,51* -5,64*
p3 -3,18* -1,91 -6,51* -5,26
p4 -1,67 -1,58 -4,45 -4,65
p5 -2,04 -1,82 -4,17 -3,81
p6 -3,04* -2,65* -3,58 -3,26
p7 -3,12* -2,59* -3,64 -3,22
p8 -3,95* -3,69* -6,02* -5,50*
FOREIGN 0,66 -0,47 1,18 -0,84
Ya -3,10* -1,56 -6,31* -4,02
Yr -0,24 -0,22 0,58 0,44
UNEMPL -2,64* -5,29* -3,43 -6,64*
M15-24 3,73 -7,01* 5,04 -7,72*
Note: * represents significance at the 5% level, critical values are taken from
Levin and Lin (1992).
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